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I.    INTRODUCTION 
This is a critical analysis of Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.’s new book, The 
Disappearing First Amendment.1  Krotoszynski lays out the main thesis of the 
book as follows: “Free speech rights have contracted, rather than expanded, 
in areas where the decisions of First Amendment claims requires open-
ended balancing of the interests of would-be speakers, on the one hand, and 
the government, on the other.”2  This book provides a strong counter 
narrative3 to the claim that modern free speech rights have been on a 
universal upward trajectory.4  Krotoszynski provides examples to support 
this claim ranging from valid (e.g., the modern public forum doctrine 
reducing access to government property for speech activity)5 to misguided 
(e.g., decreased academic freedom).6 
Krotoszynski is up-front about how this is not a neutral assessment of 
the issue.7  This is both a blessing and a curse.8  His passion for the subject 
makes for a more engaging read.9  However, the one-sided nature of the 
book will likely leave the reader wanting to hear the other side.10  
Furthermore, Krotoszynski makes some dubious claims in the furtherance 
 
1. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE DISAPPEARING FIRST AMENDMENT (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2019). 
2. Id. at xiv. 
3. See generally id. (countering the common view that free speech rights are on the rise). 
4. See, e.g., Eric M. McLeod & Joseph S. Diedrich, John Doe II and Political Speech: A Constitutional 
Perspective, 90 WIS. L., Jul. Aug 2017 at 28, 32 (stating “one can map a trajectory of expanding free 
speech protection, especially when political expression is at stake”). 
5. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 24 (stating, under the traditional public forum doctrine, 
there existed “a general duty on the part of government to make public property available for First 
Amendment activity”, but today, “the burden has shifted to would-be speakers to show that 
government property constitutes a traditional public forum or a designated public forum”). 
6. See id. at 99–100 (“The erosion of protection for academic freedom in the contemporary 
United States has more to do with university practices that do not, strictly speaking, seek to punish 
academics for their speech but rather use other, constitutionally permissible policies to discipline or 
fire academics who prove troublesome.”). 
7. See id. at xiv (“Whether or not the pages that follow [my thesis] adequately prove it out will 
be up to its readers to decide for themselves.”). 
8. See Robert J. Condlin, “Cases on Both Sides”: Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute-Negotiation, 
44 MD. L. REV. 65, 86–87 (1985) (stating an “[a]rgument needs focus” and encouraging “emphasiz[ing] 
certain points above others”, but also expressing a “[g]ood argument is rarely one-sided”). 
9. See HEIDI K. BROWN, THE MINDFUL LEGAL WRITER: MASTERING PERSUASIVE WRITING 
110 (Wolters Kluwer 2016) (stating “good lawyers . . . inject personality and passion into the legal 
writing . . . to captivate and engage the reader”). 
10. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant at *5, People v. Herring, No. 345/02, 2004 WL 
3253031 (N.Y. App. Div. April 21, 2004)(“[I]t is human nature, everyone wants to hear both sides of the 
story.”). 
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of his point.11  While Krotoszynski is not shy about expressing his support 
for advancing free speech, he does so in a manner that is politically 
viewpoint neutral.12  He never gives even the slightest intimation that his 
support for free speech is contingent upon his personal views about the 
speech in question.13 
This review is a critique of some of the claims from the book.  It reaches 
the conclusion that, despite some valid examples of free speech rights 
decreasing in specific categories,14 free speech rights overall have increased 
in modern years, not decreased.15 
II.    THE SELMA MARCH COULD NOT HAPPEN TODAY 
Krotoszynski poses the thought-provoking question: could the Selma 
March take place today?16  Viewing modern free speech jurisprudence 
through this lens17 is an engaging thought experiment and a brilliant tactical 
move by Krotoszynski because, as he makes clear, the march would likely 
not be allowed under similar circumstances today.18  Pointing out that one 
of the most celebrated demonstrations in United States history19 might not 
 
11. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 99–103 (asserting the majority opinion in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), contracted faculty speech established in “the Supreme Court’s prior 
academic freedom precedents”). 
12. See id. at xiii (“[I]t is essential to the process of democratic self-government ‘that everything 
worth saying shall be said,’ an approach that empowers more ordinary citizens to speak—and thereby 
to contribute to the process of democratic deliberation—should be preferred to an approach that 
generates predictable results but less speech.”). 
13. See generally id. (omitting personal, political viewpoints which might cloud the objectivity of 
the thesis). 
14. See generally id. (providing examples throughout indicating decreasing free speech rights). 
15. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Huddleston, Free Speech in the Age of Political Correctness: Removing Free Speech 
Zones on College Campuses to Encourage Civil Discourse, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 279, 285–86 (“In Roberts 
v. Haragan [346 F. Supp. 2d 853 (N.D. Tex. 2004)], the [court] found certain elements of [the] 
University’s speech regulations to be facially unconstitutional because they . . . limit[ed] students’ 
potentially controversial speech and printed materials to a designated area . . . on the basis that colleges 
and universities could not limit speech to specific areas of campus, because a public university would 
be considered a public forum.”). 
16. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 7. 
17. Id. 
18. See id. at 7 (“[A] march of the same majestic scale and scope could not take place—at least 
if the government now, like Alabama’s state government then, did not wish to permit such a large-scale 
protest event using a main regional transportation artery.”). 
19. See id. (“In March 2015, major celebrations took place to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Selma-to-Montgomery March.  To be sure, Selma was a defining moment in the nation’s long road to 
equal citizenship for all.”). 
3
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be allowed today20 is likely to evoke strong reactions from readers.  The 
Selma March was a part of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People’s (NAACP) Selma Project and occurred over a period of 
five days in 1965.21  The march required a multiday commandeering of a 
federal highway22—or, as Krotoszynski creatively refers to it, a “non-
obvious venue[] . . . for First Amendment activity.”23 
The Selma March comparison is highly effective, but its ultimate 
relevance for measuring current free speech protections is minimal.24  The 
decision that led to the march, Williams v. Wallace,25 is rife with questionable 
constitutional reasoning.26  Krotoszynski asserts: “The crux of 
Judge Johnson’s opinion in Williams v. Wallace rested on the proposition that 
the right to protest on public property should be commensurate with the 
scope of the constitutional wrongs being protested.”27  This is the 
“proportionality principle”28 and was viewed even by civil rights 
proponents as a novelty in the law,29 an “unusual opinion,”30 and as 
“interpret[ing] existing doctrine imaginatively.”31  Krotoszynski 
acknowledges that the Selma March required the First Amendment to be 
“creatively read” to justify the court’s “remarkably broad” order.32 
The main problem with the reasoning in Williams is that it was not content 
neutral.33  Krotoszynski acknowledges that the decision “does involve 
 
20. See id. (postulating the current government could prevent such a large scaled demonstration 
if desired). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 41. 
23. Id. at 9. 
24. See id. at 22 (stating that although “collective public protest retains salience . . . . 
Unfortunately, under the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts, the general public’s access to public property 
for collective speech activity has consistently diminished.”). 
25. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). 
26. See, e.g., RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public 
Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411, 1413, 1413 n.15 (1995) (“Most courts have not been willing to apply 
the broader proportionality principle that Judge Johnson enunciated [in Williams v. Wallace], however.”). 
27. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 8 (footnotes omitted).  
28. Id. 
29. See Burke Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L. REV. 785, 788–89 (1965) 
(stating the Court utilized the proportionality principle—“articulated, so far as [the author] know[s], 
for the first time in that decision”). 
30. Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Protest, Politics, and the First Amendment, 44 TUL. L. REV. 439, 
443–44 (1969). 
31. Id. 
32. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 7. 
33. See id. at 41 (arguing Williams was content- and viewpoint-based). 
4
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content-, and perhaps even viewpoint-, based factors.”34  Krotoszynski 
reassures the reader that the issues of content- and viewpoint-based 
discrimination are not fatal flaws because First Amendment doctrine 
contains such content-based distinctions—as in how pornography and 
commercial speech receive less free speech protections than political 
speech.35  Even “the broadly speech-protective decisions of the [Supreme 
Court during the time of the Selma March] might well have had as much to 
do with the identity of the speakers seeking access to public property for 
speech activity as with the generic requirements of the First Amendment.”36  
But this history lesson as to 1960s First Amendment jurisprudence37 does 
not address whether the federal courts should engage in this level of content-
based discrimination.38 
Krotoszynski’s position on the matter could be summarized as an “ends 
justify the means” approach.  It can logically be reduced to: The Selma March 
was good.  The Selma March necessitated this particular view of free speech; therefore, this 
particular view of free speech is good.39  This, however, only looks at how the 
proportionality principle provided a favorable outcome in this one 
instance.40  The negative outcomes that would follow from this 
constitutional standard are not addressed. 
It is also important to note that the decision in Williams is not an example 
of the judiciary taking a principled stand against public opinion in order to 
protect the free speech rights of a minority view.  The Selma March was 
more popular in 1965 than many people may realize today.41  A Gallup poll 
 
34. Id. 
35. See id at 41–42 (“Pornography and commercial speech receive less robust First Amendment 
protection than political speech.”). 
36. Id. at 23. 
37. See supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text. 
38. Cf. Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination in the 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals after Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 191 (2019) (discussing 
the ambiguity of the content discrimination doctrine and how it is applied in various federal courts). 
39. See, e.g., KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 231 (citation omitted) (“Historians have generally 
credited the Selma Project, and the Selma-to-Montgomery March, with catalyzing the legislative 
process and securing enactment of the Voting Rights Act.”). 
40. See id. at 2 (“The outcome in any given case [applying the proportionality principle] would 
depend on how the scale came to rest.  Of course, this . . . proportionality[] approach meant that . . . 
cases with very similar facts would, from time to time, and place to place, receive different judicial 
outcomes.”). 
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found 76% support for the equal rights voting law—a main reason for the 
Selma March.42  Other polls in 1965 showed significant support for the 
Selma March.43  Even among whites, 46% supported civil rights groups, 
compared to just 21% who sided with the state of Alabama.44 
III.    NECESSITY OF MODERN PUBLIC PROTESTS 
Krotoszynski wisely predicts the objection that, with the advent of the 
internet and social media, large-scale public protests such as the Selma 
March are less relevant today.45  Krotoszynski disagrees by claiming online 
advocacy does not have the same power to promote a message as public 
protests, whereas online advocacy faces a greater risk of viewpoint 
discrimination, and public protests do not face the same problem of 
“siloing” as social media.46 
The success of the #MeToo movement is a powerful counterargument 
to Krotoszynski’s claim regarding the inferiority of online advocacy.  In the 
first year, “#MeToo” was tweeted 19 million times,47 and the movement 
brought down over 200 powerful men.48  And this is all despite the 
#MeToo movement being less popular than the Selma March.49 
 
42. Id. 
43. E.g., Andrew Kohut, From the Archives: 50 Years Ago: Mixed Views About Civil Rights but Support 
for Selma Demonstrators, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/01/16/50-years-ago-mixed-views-about-civil-rights-but-support-for-selma-demonstrators 
/ [https://perma.cc/H8LE-SMDN].  
44. See id. (“[T]he balance of opinion among whites was also clearly with [the Selma 
Demonstrators] rather than with the state of Alabama (46% to 21%).”). 
45. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 22 (“Moreover, this holds true even in the age of the 
internet.”). 
46. See id. (“[P]ublic protests . . . permit the effective targeting of a particular audience and 
also . . . open[] up a wider dialogue within the body politic as a whole . . . [a] Facebook post or Twitter 
“tweet” lacks these important characteristics[,] . . . need not permit speech that they would prefer to 
censor[,] . . . [and] are not cabined by constitutional proscriptions against viewpoint or content 
discrimination.”). 
47. The #MeToo Hashtag Has Been Used Roughly 19 Million Times on Twitter in the Past Year, and Usage 
Often Surges Around News Events, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/10/11/how-social-media-users-have-discussed-sexual-harassment-since-metoo-went-
viral/ft_18-10-11_metooanniversary_hashtag-used-19m_times/ [https://perma.cc/5LER-Q6TN]. 
48. Audrey Carlesen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements 
Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html (last visited May 3, 2020). 
49. See Ariel Edwards-Levy, Here’s What America Thinks About the #MeToo Movement Now, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2018) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/poll-me-too-sexual-
harassment_n_5b7dcbdde4b07295150f7e5e [https://perma.cc/LHM5-XJFJ] (reporting on a survey 
that found less than half of Americans hold a favorable view of #MeToo). 
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Krotoszynski rightly points out that social media platforms such as 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter are privately owned and are consequently 
free to engage in viewpoint discrimination.50  Therefore, Krotoszynski 
continues, this new virtual town square is not an adequate replacement for 
the traditional town square.51  But it is unlikely that any message so 
abhorrent that it would be barred from social media would have enough 
supporters willing to participate in a public demonstration comparable to 
the Selma March. 
“Siloing of audiences” is when listeners and viewers “filter speech they 
do not wish to hear.”52  Krotoszynski claims that siloing is more of a 
problem in online advocacy than in public demonstrations.  Social media 
companies do utilize complex algorithms to help ensure that consumers see 
more of the messages they agree with and less of what they do not.53  
Nevertheless, it is unclear if public demonstrations are any better.  Using the 
author’s own illustration, it seems unlikely that protestors in the Selma 
March directly confronted anti-voting rights activists in debate.  One might 
claim that, while the march itself was not designed to directly stop people 
on the highway and engage them in a conversation, the media coverage of 
the event would have sparked conversations at schools, dinner tables, and 
water coolers.  While valid, applying this logic to the modern-day news 
environment results in a circular argument.  Namely, if the benefit of public 
demonstrations is increased media coverage, then that coverage will 
ultimately end up in the exact same internet-filtered silos that are being 
criticized. 
Finally, the benefits of government-vetted public demonstrations must 
be weighed against the dangers of government being entrusted with the 
power to pick and choose which messages to promote.  Krotoszynski largely 
touts the benefits of the former, while ignoring the dangers of the latter. 
Krotoszynski is strikingly up-front with how far he wants to extend the 
right to public protest.  He even promotes the notion of military bases, 
which are generally closed to the public due to safety concerns and the 
 
50. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 22. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 42. 
53. Lisa Schmeiser, The Effect of Facebook’s Social Media Silo on Itself and You, OBSERVER  
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presence of classified information, being required to open up for public 
protests.54 
Discussing the pros and cons of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ 
limiting of free speech rights in the public square is a legitimate conversation 
to have.  Unfortunately, Krotoszynski does not provide a balanced analysis 
of the issue.  Equally unfortunate is that he occasionally ventures off into 
hyperbole.  For example, “ownership of property should not be a de facto 
precondition of participating in the process of democratic deliberation.”55 
Statements like these are more reminiscent of the rhetoric a disingenuous 
politician would use to gain support from an uneducated electorate than an 
intellectually honest assessment of an issue.  Those without property are not 
barred from participating in democratic deliberation, as Krotoszynski 
incorrectly asserts.  To the contrary, with the advent of social media, their 
ability to participate has increased. 
IV.    WHISTLEBLOWING SPEECH 
Krotoszynski does an excellent job of framing whistleblower protections 
as an efficient mechanism for creating more well-informed voters, which is 
necessary for a successful democracy.56  In order for the press to play its 
vital role, he explains, it must be able to “obtain and disseminate accurate 
information about the government’s activities.”57 
Krotoszynski is clear that “federal courts should deploy the First 
Amendment as a shield for whistleblowing speech.”58  He also makes it 
clear that, in his opinion, current protections are not “robust” or “reliable” 
enough.59  He proposes the creation of a new “whistleblowing” category of 
speech.60  This would offer heightened protection to employees in the 
government, but not the private sector.61 
Krotoszynski presents a powerful analogy in support of more 
whistleblower protections by pointing out that government employees are 
 
54. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 42. 
55. Id. at 26. 
56. Id. at 75. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 76. 
59. Id. at 77. 
60. Id. 
61. See id. at 78 (stating “only government employee speakers can engage in whistleblowing 
speech because they are uniquely situated to provide the body politic with the information it must have 
to ensure government accountability through the democratic process”). 
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provided near-absolute protection against their employment being 
contingent upon partisan loyalty.62  “If the potential disruption of a 
government office is not a sufficient predicate for firing an employee based 
on her partisan identity, the same logic would suggest that government 
should be equally debarred from firing a government employee who speaks 
out on a matter of public concern.”63  Another illustrative analogy 
presented in support of increased whistleblower protections is that of the 
Westboro Baptist Church (WBC).64  The WBC is the group that protests 
soldiers’ funerals, among other events, with signs that read, for example, 
“Thank God for dead soldiers” and “Fags die, God laughs.”65  
Krotoszynski points out that if the Supreme Court maintains that the WBC’s 
message is “speech about a matter of public concern,” then whistleblowing 
speech that implicates government policy certainly is as well.66 
V.    FACULTY AND STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
As with the section on Freedom of the Press, this section presents a 
strong case for the necessity of academic freedom in a democracy.  
Unfortunately, this section is also similar to other sections in the book in 
that it engages in hyperbolic claims.  Krotoszynski claims that the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts have “significantly”67 reduced First Amendment 
protections for faculty and students. 
It is unclear how much the current state of free speech on college 
campuses is the fault of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.  Yes, colleges in 
the twenty-first century have adopted “bureaucratic solutions such as safe 
spaces, speech codes, and free-speech zones,”68 but Krotoszynski is unable 
to link these practices to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts directly.  He 
provides the peculiar example of the University of Oklahoma President, 
David Boren, expelling students for engaging in a racist chant at an off-
 
62. See id. at 77 (describing a freedom from a “spoils system in which government officials 
condition government employment on partisan loyalty”). 
63. Id. 
64. See id. at 90 (purporting “Westboro Baptist Church’s lunacy compris[ing] speech about a 
matter of public concern” opens the door for nearly anything else tangentially related to government 
policy to meet that standard). 
65. Signs, WESTBORO BAPTIST CHURCH, https://www.godhatesfags.com/signs/index2.html 
[https://perma.cc/9MH2-TQKZ]. 
66. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 90. 
67. Id. at 95. 
68. Id. at 96. 
9
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campus fraternity event.69  Leading constitutional law scholars point out 
that this was a violation of the students’ free speech rights.70  However, this 
does nothing to support the claim that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts 
have “significantly” reduced free speech rights on campus.  The expelled 
students never sought legal action, so there was never adjudication regarding 
the legitimacy of the university’s behavior.  Therefore, presenting the 
University of Oklahoma incident as evidence of the Supreme Court 
“significantly” reducing free speech rights is misguided. 
To strengthen the claim that academic freedom is decreasing, 
Krotoszynski also presents the example of Gene Nichol.71  Specifically, 
Krotoszynski employs the Nichol example to support the claim that 
academic freedom is “less robust” now than it was during the Red Scare of 
1917–1920.72  An honest assessment of the facts leading to Nichol’s 
contract not being renewed—which Krotoszynski omits from the book—
does not support this conclusion.  While serving as President of the College 
of William & Mary, Nichol allowed student funds to pay for a sex worker 
show on campus.73  The show included nude dancing and sex toys.74  
Nichol also removed a cross from the campus chapel, where it had been 
located for over 60 years.75  These actions led to threats to revoke promised 
donations, including a $12 million gift from a wealthy donor.76  The 2008 
financial crisis exacerbated the risk of significant loss of endowment and the 
subsequent looming state budget cuts.77  The board elected not to renew 
Nichol’s contract in 2008.78 
In order to present the Nichol incident as evidence that free speech 
protection is “less robust” now than in 1917–1920, it must be shown that a 
 
69. Id. at 97. 
70. Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Expulsion of Two Oklahoma Students Over Video Leads to 
Free Speech Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/expulsion-
of-two-oklahoma-students-leads-to-free-speech-debate.html [https://perma.cc/EXT8-QPAQ]. 
71. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 96. 
72. Id. 





76. Max Fisher, When the Campus PC Police are Conservative: Why Media Ignored the Free Speech 
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similarly-situated college professor would have received constitutional 
protection at that time.  Krotoszynski never presents any reason to believe 
that this would be the case.  Furthermore, the state of First Amendment 
jurisprudence in 1917–1920 does not support the claim.  A college president 
in 1917–1920 who significantly reduced the college endowment by 
removing a cross from the chapel and allowing student funds to be spent 
on a performance that included nude dancing and dildos would almost 
certainly not receive wrongful termination protection, just as in 2008. 
Krotoszynski anticipates the objection that there is no good evidence to 
believe that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts significantly reduced 
academic freedom.  He attempts to address this objection by stating: 
The erosion of protection for academic freedom in the contemporary United 
States has more to do with university practices . . . .  In this sense then, the 
diminution of academic freedom in the college and university context has not 
been because of subsequent judicial decisions . . . but rather because of a 
failure to expand on them . . . .79 
This admission contradicts the explicit accusation that opens this section of 
the book: “The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, however, have significantly 
reduced the scope of First Amendment protection available to faculty and 
students alike in the nation’s public schools, colleges, and universities.”80 
Elsewhere in the book, Krotoszynski claims that the effort to extend 
academic freedom principles to primary, middle, and secondary public 
schools has been a process of “one step forward, two steps back.”81  But 
the primary example to support this claim is inadequate.  Krotoszynski 
presents Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969)82 
followed by Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986)83 in an attempt to 
illustrate his “one step forward, two steps back” claim.  Tinker held students 
had a right to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.84  In Fraser, 
the Supreme Court held a student did not have a First Amendment right to 
give a speech filled with blatant sexual innuendos at a school event.85  This 
 
79. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 1, at 223–24. 
80. Id. at 95. 
81. Id. at 103. 
82. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
83. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
84. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
85. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686. 
11
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is hardly “one step forward, two steps back.”  Bethel v. Fraser did not move 
First Amendment protections behind where they were after Tinker. 
The current state of academic freedom is a relevant free speech issue to 
discuss—and a strong case can certainly be made that more protections 
should be implemented in that area.  But to instead focus on the dubious 
narrative that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have “significantly” 
reduced free speech protections in this area does not promote healthy 
debate on the topic. 
VI.    NET GAIN OR LOSS? 
Krotoszynski focuses on the areas where, allegedly, free speech is in 
decline.  But in order to assess whether there has been a net loss in free 
speech rights, both sides of the equation must be considered—meaning, the 
areas where free speech has decreased must be proportionately weighed 
against the areas where they have increased.  This is the only way to assess 
the net effect.  An honest assessment of this equation should lead the 
rational observer to conclude that free speech rights have not decreased 
under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, as Krotoszynski claims. 
As previously discussed, there has been a slight reduction in free speech 
rights in the area of demonstrations on public property.  However, this is 
more than compensated for with significant increases in other free speech 
areas: 
•  Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 86 held public figures must show actual 
malice to recover on a theory of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.87 
•  Texas v. Johnson88 held burning the flag is a constitutionally protected 
act.89 
•  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission90 held labor union and 
corporate spending on certain electioneering communications is 
protected free speech.91 
 
86. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
87. Id. at 56. 
88. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
89. Id. at 420. 
90. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
91. Id. at 319. 
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•  Snyder v. Phelps92 held that even the extreme messages of the 
Westboro Baptist Church are considered speech of a public 
concern and, therefore, cannot be the basis for tort liability under a 
theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.93 
•  Janus v. AFSCME94 held mandatory public-sector union fees 
violated the free speech rights of objecting employees.95 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in this review, the book makes some prescient points about 
areas where free speech has been decreasing.  This is a worthwhile endeavor 
because these areas of decreasing free speech rights—such as reduced access 
to government property for speech activity—receive less media attention 
than areas of increased free speech, such as those in Janus and Citizens United.  
However, Krotoszynski engages in hyperbole by claiming that, overall, free 
speech protections have been decreasing.  The case could be made that 
previous Supreme Court rulings have produced more significant gains for 
free speech than under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.  But the claim 
that there are, on net, significantly less free speech protections under the 
modern Supreme Court is a largely untenable position. 
Despite its flaws, the book provides a very thorough and highly 
referenced account of often-overlooked free speech topics.  Those who 
already possess a working understanding of free speech jurisprudence, and 
who can assess the book’s claims with a skeptical mind, will no doubt benefit 
from reading the book. 
  
 
92. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
93. Id. at 458–59. 
94. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps. Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
95. Id. at 2486. 
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